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Texas State Senator Wendy Davis drew national attention in June 2013
when she staged one of the longer filibusters in United States history—nearly
eleven hours—in an effort to prevent a vote on pending legislation that
would “ban[ ] abortions after 20 weeks of pregnancy in Texas, severely
limit[ ] access to medication-induced abortions and regulate[ ] first-trimester
abortion clinics as ambulatory surgical centers.”1  Repeatedly during her fili-
buster, Davis asked her colleagues to describe the ways in which the legisla-
tion would achieve its stated purpose of increasing women’s safety.2  In
particular, she questioned how the requirement that “clinics be regulated in
the same way as ambulatory surgical centers” would increase women’s safety
when not all Texas abortion clinics provide surgical abortions.3  Davis
received no response.4
The fervor currently surrounding abortion legislation in the United
States, and, specifically, the requirement that abortion clinics be held to
ambulatory surgical center standards, form the topic of this Note.  The
strongest criticism of these regulations is that they are motivated by legisla-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2015; M.A.,
History of Art, Courtauld Institute of Art, University of London, 2012; B.A., History of Art
and English Literature, University of Virginia, 2011.  Thanks to Professor Amy Coney
Barrett for her guidance and support in writing this Note.  Errors are mine.
1 Laura Bassett, Wendy Davis, Texas Democrat, Fights Abortion Bill with 13-Hour Filibuster,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 25, 2013, 5:28 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/
25/wendy-davis-filibuster_n_3498699.html; see also Jon Henley, Wendy Davis and the Lengthy
History of the Filibuster, THE GUARDIAN (June 26, 2013, 12:43 PM), http://www.theguardian
.com/world/2013/jun/26/wendy-davis-lengthy-history-filibuster (“Senator Wendy Davis’s
courageous—and successful—10 hour 45 minute bid to block a law that would have radi-
cally restricted access to abortion in Texas by talking was a wonder to behold.”); Andy
McSmith, Wendy Davis’ 10-hour Speech Propels Her into the Filibuster Super League.  She’s in
Varied Company, THE INDEPENDENT (June 26, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/
voices/comment/wendy-davis-10hour-speech-propels-her-into-the-filibuster-super-league-
shes-in-varied-company-8674365.html (“Davis’ speech blocking an anti-abortion bill is a his-
torical achievement.”).
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tors’ efforts to close clinics, rather than to ensure maternal health and
safety.5  As of November 4, 2014, the Guttmacher Institute6 identified facility
regulations in twenty-five states that “go beyond what is necessary to ensure
patients’ safety.”7  In more than half those states, the regulations apply to all
abortion clinics equally, those in which surgical abortions are performed and
those in which no surgical abortions are performed (clinics providing only
medication-induced abortions).8
This Note argues that requiring abortion clinics to adhere to the same
standards as ambulatory surgical centers is unconstitutional, at least in the
context of those clinics that provide only medication abortion, because it
unduly burdens a woman’s right to choose whether to obtain an abortion.
Although there may be a rational basis to require abortion clinics offering
surgical abortion procedures to meet surgical facility standards, no such basis
attends the imposition of those requirements on clinics that provide non-
surgical services.  Given the number of clinics that continue to close in the
face of this new regulatory legislation—which significantly reduces access to
abortion services, increases their cost, and makes them logistically more diffi-
cult to procure due to increased geographic travel—it is arguable that even
requiring surgical abortion clinics to meet ambulatory surgical center stan-
dards will result in an undue burden.
At the same time, however, state legislators have a valid interest in ensur-
ing that abortion procedures are conducted in a safe manner.  Although
abortion clinics currently are subject to regulatory oversight outside the
realm of state-specific statutes, the requirements currently in place govern
the privacy of patients’ health records,9 laboratory testing practices,10 and
5 See generally, e.g., Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, TRAP Laws Gain Political
Traction While Abortion Clinics—and the Women They Serve—Pay the Price, GUTTMACHER POL’Y
REV., Spring 2013, at 7, 8–9, 12 (describing the basic content of TRAP laws, highlighting
examples in certain states, and emphasizing clinic closure as one major impetus for their
enactment).
6 The Guttmacher Institute is a nonprofit organization dedicated to researching,
advancing, and promoting “sexual and reproductive health worldwide.” GUTTMACHER
INST., http://www.guttmacher.org (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).  Its research is cited by pro-
choice and pro-life organizations alike. See, e.g., Abortion Myths, TEXAS RIGHT TO LIFE,
http://www.texasrighttolife.com/about/145/Abortion-Myths (last visited Nov. 21, 2014);
Guttmacher Institute: Facts on American Teens’ Sexual and Reproductive Health, NARAL PRO-
CHOICE TEXAS, http://www.prochoicetexas.org/what-is-choice/sex-education/facts-on-
american-teens.shtml (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
7 GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF AS OF NOVEMBER 4, 2014: TARGETED REG-
ULATION OF ABORTION PROVIDERS (2014) [hereinafter STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF], http://www
.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_TRAP.pdf.
8 Id. (“16 states’ regulations apply to sites where medication abortion is provided,
even if surgical abortion procedures are not.”).
9 Health Information Privacy, HHS, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/ (last visited Nov.
21, 2014).
10 See Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA), FDA, http://www.fda.gov/
medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/ivdregulatoryassistance/ucm124105.htm
(last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
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workplace health and safety,11 but do not address directly the regulation of
surgical procedures.12
In light of the constitutional problems embedded in current state efforts
to regulate abortion clinic facilities and the shortcomings of federal regula-
tory efforts, it may be time to entertain a different approach to abortion
clinic regulation.  Part I presents the legal framework and standards currently
governing abortion legislation.  Part II utilizes this foundation to evaluate
current problems in state regulatory practices, spotlighting two pieces of
recent state legislation that seek to impose ambulatory surgical center stan-
dards on all abortion clinic facilities within their borders.  Lastly, Part III
introduces and outlines an alternate means of regulation—accreditation—
that offers common ground in the abortion debate by serving everyone’s
interest in providing safe, accessible medical services to women.
I. WHO REGULATES ABORTION CLINICS?
The federal and state governments concurrently regulate abortion prac-
tices and the facilities in which those practices take place.  This Part
introduces the legal framework for abortion regulation, presenting the basic
premise of the undue burden standard and the preference for as-applied
challenges—rather than facial challenges—to abortion legislation.
A. Recent State Regulations of Abortion Clinic Facilities
Recently, multiple states enacted laws restricting the facilities in which
physicians perform abortions to hospitals and clinics that meet the standards
of ambulatory surgical centers.  These pieces of state legislation require abor-
tion clinics to obtain state health department licenses, meet heightened
administrative and facility standards, and mandate hospitalization for abor-
tions performed after a threshold date in the second trimester.13  The pro-
choice movement dubbed such regulations “TRAP” laws—Targeted Regula-
tion of Abortion Providers—on grounds that the laws single out “doctors who
provide abortions, and impose on them requirements that are different and
more burdensome than those imposed on other medical practices.”14  Under
these regulations, private physicians’ offices that do not offer abortion ser-
vices are not required to obtain the same state licenses,15 and those facility
11 OSHA Law & Regulations, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.osha.gov/law-regs.html
(last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
12 See infra Section I.A.
13 Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP), CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS (Mar. 5,
2009), http://reproductiverights.org/en/project/targeted-regulation-of-abortion-provid
ers-trap (describing the basic content of TRAP laws).
14 Id.
15 Amalia W. Jorns, Note, Challenging Warrantless Inspections of Abortion Providers: A New
Constitutional Strategy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1563, 1568 (2005).
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regulations imposed on abortion providers are “not imposed on other medi-
cal facilities.”16
Although many disagree with these new regulatory measures, the
Supreme Court has been quite clear that states have the power to regulate
abortion practices in light of the legitimate governmental interests in mater-
nal safety and the promotion of life.  In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,17 the Supreme Court restored to the states much of the
regulatory power they lost under Roe v. Wade18 by replacing the trimester
framework with an “undue burden standard.”19  The Casey Court described
this standard as “shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”20  Accordingly, a statute whose
purpose is not to “inform the woman’s free choice, [but] . . . hinder it”21 will
be held invalid, as will a statute that furthers one of the state’s legitimate
interests but “has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman’s choice.”22  This new standard lowered the level of protection that
Roe initially secured: post-Casey, the courts will uphold any state regulatory
measure that does not pose a “substantial obstacle” to a woman’s decision to
obtain an abortion.23  In designing regulatory measures in furtherance of the
legitimate interest in maternal health, the state may consider both the physi-
cal and psychological consequences of having an abortion and legislate
accordingly.24  As such, the majority of discussion today centers on whether
the state regulation imposes a “substantial obstacle” on a woman’s ability to
obtain an abortion.25
16 Ania O. Wlodek, Note, Legal Does Not Mean Rational: The Practicality of Treating First-
Trimester Abortion Clinics the Same as Hospitals, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 395, 407
(2012) (citing Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 66 F. Supp. 2d 691, 742 (D.S.C. 1999),
rev’d, 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000)) (finding that state regulations in question specifically
targeted abortion providers); see id. at 406–07.
17 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
18 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19 Casey, 505 U.S. at 873, 876 (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)
(rejecting the trimester framework set forth in Roe v. Wade on grounds that it undervalued
the state’s legitimate interest in potential life).
20 Id. at 877.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Christopher Mirakian, Gonzales v. Carhart: A New Paradigm for Abortion Legislation,
77 UMKC L. REV. 197, 209–10 (2008).
24 Jared H. Jones, Annotation, Women’s Reproductive Rights Concerning Abortion, and Gov-
ernmental Regulation Thereof—Supreme Court Cases, 20 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1, § 8 (2007)
(“[F]actors regarding the mother’s heath not only include those related [to] physical well-
being, but also psychological considerations, amongst others.”).
25 The Casey Court made clear that “regulations which do no more than create a struc-
tural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express
profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial
obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (joint
opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).  Further, “[u]nless it . . . [places a sub-
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This regulatory power extends to the facilities in which abortions are
performed.  In Simopoulos v. Virginia,26 the Court held that Virginia’s require-
ment that “second-trimester abortions be performed in licensed clinics is not
an unreasonable means of furthering the State’s compelling interest in ‘pro-
tecting the woman’s own health and safety.’”27  Though this decision came
down prior to Casey, Casey did not overrule Simopoulos.  To the contrary, the
Casey Court specifically included Simopoulos in a string citation of cases sup-
porting its conclusion that “only where state regulation imposes an undue
burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision [to obtain an abortion]
does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause.”28
Recognizing the states’ ability to regulate abortion clinic facilities, the
question becomes whether the new requirement that abortion clinics satisfy
the facility standards for ambulatory surgical centers is in furtherance of the
legitimate interest in maternal safety and, if so, whether such regulations
impose an undue burden on a woman’s ability to seek an abortion.  As of
November 4, 2014, twenty-three states required abortion clinics to meet the
facility standards for ambulatory surgical centers.29  Ambulatory surgical cen-
ters are clinical facilities that provide same-day outpatient surgical care.30
Although each state dictates additional requirements, at a minimum, every
ambulatory surgical center must have “at least one dedicated operating room
and the equipment needed to perform surgery.”31  Given that most ambula-
tory surgical centers provide care to patients covered by Medicare, they gen-
erally are subject to federal governance and must comply with standards
established by Medicare itself,32 which include regulations on “facility design
[and] patient care.”33  In addition, the centers must comply with state-spe-
cific regulations and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA).34
stantial obstacle] on her right of choice, a state measure designed to persuade her to
choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal.” Id. at
878.
26 462 U.S. 506 (1983).
27 Id. at 519 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973)).
28 Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
29 STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF, supra note 7 (“23 states require facilities where abortion
services are provided to meet standards intended for ambulatory surgical centers.”).  Two
additional states—Kansas and Texas—also have this requirement, but their laws are “tem-
porarily enjoined pending a final decision in the courts.” Id.
30 See What Is an ASC?, AMBULATORY SURGERY CTR. ASS’N, http://www.ascassociation
.org/ASCA/AboutUs/WhatisanASC (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
31 Id. (detailing the generic requirements of ambulatory surgical centers under its
description of “What ASCs Are Not”).
32 See Federal Regulations, AMBULATORY SURGERY CTR. ASS’N, http://www.ascassociation
.org/FederalRegulations/Overview/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
33 Id.  The Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) must certify and provide
ongoing oversight and compliance checks of those facilities for which federal funds are
used for the reimbursement of medical procedures. Id.
34 Id.
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Indeed, prior to this new legislation, all non-hospital clinics providing
abortion services were and continue to be subject to the regulations imposed
by HIPAA, the Clinic Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA), the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and state and local
building and fire codes.35  HIPAA regulations govern the privacy of patients’
health records and provide a mechanism for dealing with breaches of that
privacy.36  CLIA regulations cover laboratory-testing practices “on specimens
derived from humans for the purpose of providing information for the diag-
nosis, prevention, treatment of disease, or impairment of, or assessment of
health.”37  Finally, OSHA holds employers in all industries accountable to
“workplace health and safety standards,”38 as established and promulgated by
agency and state-approved plans.39
Aside from these federal regulations, many abortion clinics also are sub-
ject to “evidence-based standards,” such as those the National Abortion Fed-
eration (NAF) and International Planned Parenthood Federation (Planned
Parenthood) provide.40  These guidelines, updated annually, offer a basis for
“ongoing quality assurance . . . [with respect to] infection prevention; use of
antibiotics, analgesia and sedation; and treatment of complications.”41  They
also require “equipment and medication be available on-site to handle emer-
gencies,” and that transport procedures be in place in the event of an emer-
gency.42  All clinics that are members of NAF are required to comply with the
guidelines, which is enforced by NAF’s Clinic Services Department.43  Simi-
larly, failure to comply with Planned Parenthood’s Manual of Medical Stan-
dards, which includes clinic facility and administrative requirements, can
35 The TRAP: Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, available
at http://prochoice.org/wp-content/uploads/trap_laws.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
36 Health Information Privacy, supra note 9.
37 Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS. 1 (July 2014), http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-
Network-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/CLIABrochure.pdf.
38 OSHA Law & Regulations, supra note 11.
39 See Interlinked Information on State Plan Standards and Directives, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
https://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/std_fpc.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
40 Gold & Nash, supra note 5, at 8.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 2014 Clinical Policy Guidelines, NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, http://prochoice.org/educa
tion-and-advocacy/2014-clinical-policy-guidelines/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).  Currently,
more than 400 clinics nationwide are members of NAF. Id.  Membership benefits include
group medical malpractice insurance, violence and security support, eligibility to purchase
supplies and pharmaceuticals at reduced cost, training, and technical publications, as well
as referrals from the NAF hotline. NAF Membership, NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, http://pro
choice.org/health-care-professionals/naf-membership/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).  Cur-
rently, only four states—Wyoming, Missouri, Alaska, and Hawaii—do not have NAF-affili-
ated clinics. Find a Provider, NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, http://prochoice.org/think-youre-
pregnant/find-a-provider/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
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result in clinics being stripped of their Planned Parenthood affiliation.44
However, independent clinics unaffiliated with either of these larger organi-
zations are not subject to such guidelines.45
Accordingly, although it is true that abortion clinics are subject to some
regulatory oversight, the regulations currently in place do not address surgi-
cal procedures directly.  HIPAA and CLIA regulations do not mandate that
all clinic facility standards match those of ambulatory surgical centers.  The
evidence-based standards that NAF and Planned Parenthood promulgate do
not govern all clinics, only those with affiliation, and do not have the force of
law.  Moreover, since the Hyde Amendment prohibits the use of federal
funds to obtain an abortion,46 abortion clinics would not be required to meet
the facility design requirements specified by the Center for Medicare & Medi-
caid Services if they provide no other services for which Medicare or Medi-
caid funds might be used in reimbursement.47
B. Challenging Current Abortion Regulations
Plaintiffs may bring facial or as-applied challenges against abortion stat-
utes, but the Supreme Court now prefers the latter.  The difference between
the challenges is substantial.  As Professor Michael Dorf explains: “If a court
holds a statute unconstitutional on its face, the state may not enforce it under
any circumstances, unless an appropriate court narrows its application; in
contrast, when a court holds a statute unconstitutional as applied to particu-
lar facts, the state may enforce the statute in different circumstances.”48
Although Casey itself was a facial challenge, the Supreme Court since has
44 See Katharine Mieszkowski, Planned Parenthood Clinics Are Stripped of Affiliation After
Complaints, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/29/us/29bcpar
enthood.html (reporting on local clinic in San Francisco bay area stripped of Planned
Parenthood affiliation for allegedly failing to comply with parent corporation’s administra-
tive standards).
45 See Samuel W. Calhoun, Stopping Philadelphia Abortion Provider Kermit Gosnell and
Preventing Others Like Him: An Outcome That Both Pro-Lifers and Pro-Choicers Should Support, 57
VILL. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2012) (noting that Planned Parenthood and NAF regulations do
not govern independent clinics, to which Planned Parenthood and NAF clinics refer
patients for abortion services they do not offer themselves).
46 Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965 to provide funds for the medical care of low-
income persons through a cost-splitting arrangement between the federal and state gov-
ernments. See JON O. SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33467, ABORTION: JUDICIAL
HISTORY AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 11 (2014). Although the arrangement did not initially
cover reimbursement for abortion, the Nixon administration made this possible following
the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe. Id.  This coverage ended in 1976 when Congressman
Henry Hyde, a Republican representative from Illinois, successfully submitted a Medicaid
budget provision that foreclosed the application of Medicaid funds to those women seek-
ing an abortion for any reason other than absolute medical necessity. See Dorothy E.
McBride, Abortion in the United States 48 (2008) (noting that Medicaid “is required to
pay for ‘medically necessary’ procedures”).
47 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
48 Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235,
236 (1994).
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signaled that it is more appropriate for petitioners to bring as-applied chal-
lenges against abortion legislation.  This trend began in the appellate courts
and reached fruition in Gonzales v. Carhart.49  Although facial challenges
remain available to plaintiffs, the standard governing such challenges is now
unclear.  Looking forward, those seeking to bring challenges against recent
state regulations of abortion clinic facilities likely will advance as-applied
challenges.
The federal courts of appeals currently apply differing facial challenge
standards in the context of abortion legislation.  In Greenville Women’s Clinic v.
Commissioner,50 the Fourth Circuit upheld provisions of a South Carolina law
that imposed a variety of restrictions on abortion clinics, including require-
ments that clergy members be on call, physicians obtain admitting privileges
at local hospitals or that clinics sign transfer agreements with local hospitals,
and clinics “review, copy, and retain abortion patients’ medical records with-
out protecting any personally identifying information in those records from
public disclosure.”51  In making its determination, the Fourth Circuit looked
to the facial challenge standard set forth in United States v. Salerno,52 which
stated that “facial challenges can succeed outside the First Amendment only
when a statute has no valid applications.”53  Consequently, the Fourth Circuit
refused to overturn the state statutory scheme for being facially unconstitu-
tional unless “no set of circumstances exist[ed] under which the Act would
be valid.”54
However, two years prior, the Third Circuit in Planned Parenthood of Cen-
tral New Jersey v. Farmer55 explained that Casey “muted the Salerno requirement
in the abortion context by stating that a statute regulating abortion is facially
invalid if ‘in a large fraction of the cases in which [the statute] is relevant, it
will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice to undergo an abor-
tion.’”56  In deciding Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden,57 the Ninth Circuit came
to the same conclusion: Salerno applied to all facial challenges except those
49 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
50 317 F.3d 357 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1008 (2003).  For the “odyssey” of
this case’s procedural history, see Emma L. Brackett, Comment, “Trapped”: Greenville
Women’s Clinic v. Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Health & Environmental
Control and the Proliferation of Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 511,
518–24, 518 n.67 (2005).
51 Brackett, supra note 50, at 521.
52 481 U.S. 739, 745, 755 (1987) (holding the Bail Reform Act of 1984 valid under
both the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and Excessive Bail Clause of the
Eighth Amendment because petitioners failed to meet the heavy burden of a facial chal-
lenge, which requires “establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the
Act would be valid”).
53 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1322 (2000) (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745).
54 Brackett, supra note 50, at 520 (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745).
55 220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000).
56 Id. at 142 (alteration in original) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992) (majority opinion)).
57 379 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 2004).
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brought against abortion laws.58  As such, both the Third and Ninth Circuits
determined that, in the context of abortion, Salerno does not apply; instead,
plaintiffs need only show that the challenged legislation would create an
undue burden in a large fraction of cases, rather than in all cases.  More
recently, in both October 2013 and October 2014, the Fifth Circuit drew
attention to the ambiguity surrounding the application of Salerno to abortion
legislation.  In both cases the court declined to state whether it would follow
the Salerno “no set of circumstances” standard or the Casey “large fraction”
standard, as it found that even under the latter, the legislation at issue did
not constitute an undue burden.59
Justices Scalia and Thomas repeatedly have drawn attention to the need
to clarify the standard governing facial challenges to abortion statutes.60  In
Gonzales v. Carhart the Supreme Court made clear that where there is medical
uncertainty as to the necessity of a procedure or potential risks involved
therein, all pre-enforcement challenges to abortion legislation should be
brought as-applied, because “[i]n an as-applied challenge the nature of the
medical risk can be better quantified and balanced than in a facial attack.”61
The Court acknowledged that the burden facing plaintiffs bringing facial
challenges “in the specific context of abortion statutes has been a subject of
some question,”62 but declined to provide clarification.  Accordingly, the
Court did not foreclose facial challenges, but the extent of the plaintiffs’ bur-
den—specifically, the applicability of Salerno in the abortion context—
remains unclear and the Court signaled a clear preference for as-applied
challenges.  In light of such ambiguity, those preparing arguments against
abortion legislation may be better served in framing the challenge on an as-
applied basis.
58 Id. at 538–39 (“In United States v. Salerno, the Supreme Court held that one facially
challenging a statute ‘must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
Act would be valid. . . . [W]e have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the
limited context of the First Amendment.’  In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, however, the
Court held that an abortion law is unconstitutional on its face if ‘in a large fraction of the
cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s
choice to undergo an abortion.’  With respect to plaintiffs’ undue burden claim, we follow
the Casey standard.  With respect to other facial constitutional challenges, we generally
follow the Salerno standard.” (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Salerno,
481 U.S. at 745, and Casey, 505 U.S. at 895)).
59 See Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, No. 14-50928, 2014 WL 4930907, at *6–7 (5th
Cir. Oct. 2, 2014), vacated in part, No. 14A365, 2014 WL 5148719 (U.S. Oct. 14, 2014);
Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 406, 414
(5th Cir. 2013).
60 See Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 517 U.S. 1174, 1178 (1996) (Scalia & Thomas,
JJ., dissenting) (arguing for a grant of certiorari as the question of Salerno’s applicability in
the abortion context “virtually cries out for our review”); see also Dorf, supra note 48, at 261
(arguing that the Salerno standard should not apply in the context of abortion legislation).
61 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007).
62 Id.
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II. PROBLEMS ATTENDING CURRENT REGULATORY PRACTICES
In light of the potential for surgical procedures to go awry, state legisla-
tors have a legitimate interest in ensuring that abortion clinics offer safe pro-
cedures with adequate protections.63  The states do not have an affirmative
duty to provide abortion clinics, but they are legally obligated to avoid enact-
ing legislation that imposes an undue burden on a woman’s decision to
obtain an abortion.  At the same time, it is a natural extension of the jurispru-
dence behind Casey to insist that state regulations seeking to ensure maternal
safety not have the practical effect of precluding the choice to have an abor-
tion by eliminating all or nearly all abortion service providers from a geo-
graphic area.64
Although state regulation of abortion clinics is fairly commonplace
today, in the past two years representatives in several states introduced pieces
of legislation that will have the practical effect of shuttering many abortion
clinics across the nation, leaving some states with no or very few clinics rela-
tive to the size of their female populations.  In 2013, several abortion clinics
brought suit over recently enacted laws requiring their physicians to obtain
admitting privileges at hospitals located in close proximity to the abortion
clinic.65  These suits were resolved in the clinics’ favor, allowing them to
63 Those in favor of stricter clinic facility regulations often cite the unsafe practices of
abortion provider Kermit Gosnell. See, e.g., Doctor Kermit Gosnell Found Guilty of Murdering
Infants in Late-Term Abortions, FOX NEWS (May 13, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/us/
2013/05/13/jury-split-on-2-counts-in-trial-abortion-doctor-kermit-gosnell/; Jon Hurdle,
Doctor Starts His Life Term in Grisly Abortion Clinic Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2013, http://www
.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/us/kermit-gosnell-abortion-doctor-gets-life-term.html.  It is, of
course, critical to remember that Gosnell’s conduct was criminal, and clinic facility regula-
tions are not aimed at addressing physicians’ criminal behavior, but rather ensuring that
the facilities with which women are met are safe.
64 There can be no legitimate state interest in promoting fetal life after a woman
decides to have an abortion.  Accordingly, the validity of an abortion clinic facility regula-
tion hinges on the state’s interest in maternal safety. See Calhoun, supra note 45, at 12
(“[O]nce a woman in a clinic has decided to proceed with an abortion, the chance to save
the fetus’s life has been lost.”).  One exception to this generalization that Calhoun does
not address is in the area of palliative care for infants who survive an attempted abortion.
Whether these infants have the same rights as those born naturally, rather than from a
failed abortion, is a complex topic that extends beyond the scope of this Note.  However, if
infants do have such rights, the state might reasonably regulate abortion clinic facilities in
such a way as to further its legitimate interest in fetal life, per palliative care requirements.
65 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, No. 13-cv-465-wmc, 2013
WL 3989238 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 2, 2013) (finding in favor of plaintiffs, abortion service prov-
iders in Wisconsin, and enjoining state law mandating physicians requiring abortion ser-
vices obtain admitting privileges at hospital within 30 miles of the abortion clinic), aff’d,
738 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2841 (2014); Jackson Women’s Health
Org. v. Currier, 940 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D. Miss. 2013) (finding in favor of the plaintiff, the
last women’s health clinic in Mississippi, and enjoining a state law requiring all physicians
associated with abortion clinics to obtain admitting and staff privileges at a local hospital
and board certification in obstetrics and gynecology), aff’d as modified, 760 F.3d 448 (5th
Cir. 2014) (modifying the award of a preliminary injunction only by recognizing that the
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obtain preliminary injunctions and remain open in the face of statutory
schemes that would otherwise force them to close.66
At least two cases from this year also indicate the potential for clinic
closures to factor in judicial determinations of whether a state regulation
constitutes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to choose whether to
obtain an abortion.  On August 4, 2014, an Alabama district court judge
determined that a state law requiring doctors who perform abortions to
obtain admitting privileges at a local hospital imposed an undue burden spe-
cifically because the legislation had the effect of forcing three of the state’s
five abortion clinics to close.67  Similarly, on August 29, 2014, a Texas district
court held that the state requirement that abortion clinics meet ambulatory
surgical center standards was unconstitutional because it would have the
effect of leaving operational only seven or eight abortion clinics in the
state.68
State waived its argument that the law’s implementation would not force clinics to close,
and that the court could not factor into its undue burden analysis the availability of abor-
tion services in neighboring states); Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Bentley, 951 F. Supp.
2d 1280 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (finding in favor of plaintiffs, abortion facility operators, and
enjoining state law requiring all physicians performing abortions at state-licensed clinics to
obtain staff privileges at hospital within close proximity of the clinic).
66 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
67 Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, No. 2:13cv405-MHT, 2014 WL 3809403, at
*1 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 4, 2014) (“In order to give ‘real substance to the woman’s liberty,’ while
at the same time fully honoring the State’s ability to pursue, in good faith, its own acknowl-
edged legitimate interests, this court concludes that it must hold that this requirement is
unconstitutional.  The evidence compellingly demonstrates that the requirement would
have the striking result of closing three of Alabama’s five abortion clinics, clinics which
perform only early abortions, long before viability.  Indeed, the court is convinced that, if
this requirement would not, in the face of all the evidence in the record, constitute an
impermissible undue burden, then almost no regulation, short of those imposing an out-
right prohibition on abortion, would.” (citation omitted) (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Sou-
ter, JJ.))).  Importantly, Judge Myron H. Thompson noted that although there technically
existed five clinics in Alabama at the time he wrote the opinion, there could be “as few as
three clinics in operation,” with at least one clinic seeking relocation to a new building “in
order to comply with recently enacted architectural requirements for abortion clinics.” Id.
at *49 n.2.
68 Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, No. 1:14-CV-284-LY, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
124500, at *12, 32–33 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2014); see also Eric Eckholm & Manny Fernan-
dez, Judge Rejects State Stricture on Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2014, http://www.nytimes
.com/2014/08/30/us/politics/federal-judge-strikes-down-restrictive-texas-abortion-law
.html (“The closings would have left Texas, the second-biggest state by population and by
size, with seven or eight abortion clinics, all in major cities like Houston and Dallas.
Women in El Paso in West Texas and in the Rio Grande Valley in the south would have
lived more than 150 miles—a distance ruled constitutional by a federal appeals court—
from the closest clinic in the state, in San Antonio.”).  Plaintiffs challenged the ambulatory
surgical center requirement both facially and specifically as it applied to those clinics pro-
viding only medication abortions. Whole Woman’s Health, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124500, at
*5. Judge Yeakel ruled that the ambulatory surgical center requirement was facially uncon-
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Requiring clinics to meet hospital standards in order to obtain state
licensure is strikingly similar to the requirement that certain abortions be
performed in hospitals.  Although City of Akron69 made clear that any state
law mandating second-trimester abortions occur in hospitals would not be
upheld under Roe, it is not clear whether the same would be true under
Casey.70  These building requirements—namely that the facilities meet the
higher standard required of ambulatory surgical centers—have had the
effect of closing abortion clinics nationwide.  Adherence to state ambulatory
surgical center standards would require many clinics to increase the size of
their procedure rooms and corridor widths, or to relocate to be within closer
proximity of a hospital.71  Since the trend of TRAP laws began, approxi-
mately fifty-eight clinics in twenty-four different states have either closed or
stopped providing abortion services.72
Perversely, clinic closures resulting from legislation premised on an
interest in maternal health ultimately may reduce women’s overall safety in
undergoing abortion procedures.  The reality of human nature dictates that
although state legislation likely will reduce access to legal abortions, it will
not affect the desire to obtain an abortion.  Women who do not have access
to clinics due to either cost or geography, yet remain resolute in their deci-
sion to obtain an abortion, may be forced to turn to abortion providers who
offer services illegally and most likely through more dangerous methods.
Indeed, current estimates place the risk of death from an illegal abortion at
approximately seventy times the risk of death from a legal abortion.73  After
Roe, the correlation between increased access to safe abortion procedures in
clinics and overall maternal health became starkly evident, as “there was a
ninety-four percent decline in the number of deaths”74 occurring from abor-
tion.  Importantly, as the district court recently recognized in Planned
Parenthood Southeast, Inc. v. Bentley, just because “a woman has some conceiva-
ble opportunity to exercise her right does not mean that a substantial obsta-
stitutional and enjoined its enforcement. Id. at *6, *36.  This case is discussed at greater
length in Section II.A.
69 City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
70 Id. at 433 (striking down the portion of an Ohio statute that required all second-
trimester abortions to be performed in a hospital).  The query today, under Casey, would
be whether a hospitalization requirement for second-trimester abortions constitutes an
undue burden on a woman’s decision whether to obtain an abortion.
71 STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF, supra note 7, at 1 (listing several of the most common
requirements attending state legislation requiring abortion clinics adhere to ambulatory
surgical center standards).  The Guttmacher Institute reports that of the twenty-three states
currently requiring abortion clinics’ facilities to meet the structural standards of surgical
centers, twelve states specify the minimum size of procedure rooms and width of corridors,
eleven states require the clinic to be within a certain distance of a hospital, and eight states
require abortion clinics to have a transfer agreement with a local hospital. Id. at 2.
72 Esmé E. Deprez, Abortion Clinics Close at Record Pace After States Tighten Rules, BLOOM-
BERG (Sept. 3, 2013, 8:52 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-03/abortion-
clinics-close-at-record-pace-after-states-tighten-rules.html.
73 Wlodek, supra note 16, at 420.
74 Id. at 421.
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cle to the exercise of that right is not imposed.”75  Severe impediments, such
as insurmountable cost or great geographic distance, are precisely the kinds
of burdens that might force women to seek dangerous alternatives.
To illustrate this problem, this Part will look specifically at legislation
enacted in Indiana and Texas in 2013 and evaluate whether these types of
regulations impose an undue burden on a woman’s decision to obtain an
abortion.  Although the Supreme Court initially suggested that legislation
concerning a woman’s decision to obtain an abortion would be subject to
strict scrutiny review,76 the Court indicated a change in its level of deference
to the legislature when deciding Gonzales v. Carhart: “Where [government]
has a rational basis to act, and it does not impose an undue burden, the State
may use its regulatory power . . . in furtherance of its legitimate interests in
regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for human
life, including life of the unborn.”77  The Court’s adoption of rational basis
language suggests it may grant greater deference to state legislators’ deci-
sions to require abortion clinics to meet ambulatory surgical center stan-
dards.  Still, a statute must both have a rational basis and avoid imposing an
undue burden in order to be found constitutional.  Even under a more def-
erential standard, a statute that imposes an undue burden on a woman’s
decision to obtain an abortion will be held unconstitutional—even if it has a
rational basis.
This Part addresses the undue burden and rational basis elements in
turn, and concludes with a discussion of additional problems some clinics
encounter even after meeting the ambulatory surgical center standard.
A. Does the Ambulatory Surgical Center Requirement
Create an Undue Burden?
Legislation that seeks to regulate abortion clinic facility standards is rec-
ognizably new territory.  This type of legislation imposes a direct burden on
clinics, but an indirect burden on women.  The indirect nature of a burden
on the decision to obtain an abortion, however, is not grounds for dismissing
a challenge to abortion legislation.  To the contrary, the fact that an undue
burden is indirect rather than direct has not kept courts from striking down
legislation in the past.  For example, the Nebraska statute at issue in Stenberg
v. Carhart criminalized the act of late-term abortions, thereby imposing an
indirect burden on the woman’s decision by eliminating access to profession-
als legally authorized to perform certain surgical abortion procedures.78  Yet,
the Supreme Court found the Nebraska statute’s vagueness to constitute an
75 Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Bentley, 951 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1286 (M.D. Ala.
2013).
76 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992) (joint opinion of
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
77 Mirakian, supra note 23, at 213 (alteration in original) (quoting Gonzales v. Car-
hart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007)).
78 See 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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undue burden.79  Similarly, in Sojourner T v. Edwards,80 the Fifth Circuit
found unconstitutional the Louisiana Abortion Act, which criminalized the
provision of abortion services except in extremely limited circumstances.81
No criminal liability attached to the woman undergoing an abortion, and yet
the Fifth Circuit did not hesitate to find the statute imposed an undue bur-
den under Casey.82
Certainly, some indirect burdens on choice have been upheld in the
past, such as parental consent provisions for minors83 and the elimination of
certain late-term abortion procedures.84  However, given the realities of
clinic closures and the consequent elimination of access to abortion proce-
dures for substantial geographic expanses, the burden the ambulatory surgi-
cal center standard requirement places on a woman’s decision to obtain an
abortion differs significantly from those indirect burdens in that it may
entirely preclude the option of abortion.  In contrast, the Court found the
parental consent requirement constitutional only when accompanied by a
judicial bypass option,85 and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act constitu-
tional in light of its narrow language, which permitted continued access to
the most commonly used abortion procedure.86  The Court did not perceive
these indirect burdens to foreclose abortion access—but the ambulatory sur-
gical center requirement potentially does just that.
79 Id. at 938–39, 945–46 (holding unconstitutional a Nebraska statute whose language
encompassed not only “dilation and extraction” surgical abortion procedures but also
potentially all “dilation and evacuation” procedures as well).
80 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992).
81 Id. at 29–31.
82 Id.
83 The Supreme Court upheld parental consent and notification provisions under Roe
v. Wade in its decisions in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of parental consent provisions provided such provision is accompanied by an
alternate procedure authorizing abortion), Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S.
502, 510–11 (1990) (holding that any judicial bypass option that satisfied the criteria for a
parental consent provision also would satisfy the criteria for a parental notification provi-
sion), and Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 456 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality
of parental notification provisions accompanied by an optional judicial bypass).  In Casey,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of parental notification provisions
accompanied by an optional judicial bypass. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
84 The Supreme Court upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 in Gonzales
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), rendering it illegal for doctors to knowingly perform late-
term dilation and extraction procedures in light of perceived inhumanity.  Criminalization
of this procedure, however, did not foreclose a woman from undergoing an abortion by
another procedural method, nor did it penalize doctors who perform the procedure in
absence of the requisite mens rea. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012)).
85 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
86 The Supreme Court recognized the dilation and evacuation procedure as the “most
commonly used” abortion procedure, in comparison to the less frequently utilized dilation
and extraction procedure.  Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945 (2000).
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The requirement that an abortion clinic meet the standards of an ambu-
latory surgical center in order to remain operational could impose an undue
burden on a woman’s decision to obtain an abortion in two ways.  First, legis-
lation that does not differentiate between facilities that provide only medica-
tion abortions, versus those that provide both medical and surgical (or only
surgical) abortions, likely would constitute an undue burden in light of the
effective elimination of abortion access in large geographic swaths and the
cost attendant to seeking abortion services in other states.  Second, legisla-
tion that requires abortion clinics to meet ambulatory surgical center stan-
dards within one year of enactment likely will constitute an undue burden for
similar reasons, as such time constraints will cause a large number of clinic
closures given the impossibility of raising the requisite funds and completing
the mandated renovations in the time allocated.  Both overbroad legislation
and fast-track timetables for clinic renovations are likely to result in a dra-
matic number of clinic closures, and thus are likely to constitute an undue
burden on a woman’s decision to obtain an abortion.
As of November 4, 2014, twenty-three states had laws in place requiring
that abortion facility structural standards be equivalent to those of surgical
centers and seventeen states applied regulations to abortion clinics that pro-
vided medication abortion irrespective of whether they offered surgical abor-
tion services.87  Indiana is one state with legislation in place that fails to make
the key distinction between abortion clinics that provide surgical procedures
and those that do not.  In April 2013, Indiana enacted Senate Bill 371, which
mandates that all abortion facilities, regardless of the type of abortion ser-
vices provided, maintain “separate procedure, recovery and scrub rooms like
surgical centers.”88  It does this by “[a]mend[ing] the definition of ‘abortion
clinic’” to “include facilities that provide abortion inducing drugs.”89
Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky (PPINK) filed suit in late
August 2013 challenging this provision.90
87 STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF, supra note 7.  The exceptions to these statements are Mich-
igan and Missouri, which impose surgical center standards only on facilities whose primary
service is abortion.  Michigan fails to distinguish facilities whose primary service is medica-
tion abortion only.  As of November 10, 2014, court orders temporarily enjoined the laws
in Indiana, Kansas, and Texas. Id.
88 REUTERS, Indiana: State Sued over Abortion-Clinic Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/23/us/indiana-state-sued-over-abortion-clinic-rules
.html (describing Indiana’s legislative efforts to regulate abortion clinics under the same
standards as surgical centers, regardless of the type of abortion services made available at
the clinic).
89 S.B. 371, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013).
90 Ashley Balcerzak, Planned Parenthood Sues Indiana over ‘Unconstitutional’ Abortion Law,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 23, 2013, 2:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/
23/planned-parenthood-indiana-abortion-law_n_3805436.html; accord REUTERS, supra note
88.  Given the breadth of the legislation, it is possible it will not pass even rational basis
review as the surgical requirements are being applied to facilities that do not perform
surgeries.  There is arguably no rational relation between increased maternal safety during
nonsurgical procedures and the imposition of surgical center standards on abortion clinics
performing only nonsurgical procedures. See infra Section II.B.
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The Supreme Court encountered overbroad language with analogous
effect in Stenberg v. Carhart,91 in which it struck down a Nebraska statute, the
language of which encompassed not only the more specific “dilation and
extraction” (D&X) surgical abortion procedure, but also potentially all “dila-
tion and evacuation” (D&E) procedures,92 effectively rendering surgical
abortion illegal.  Legislation that fails to distinguish between medical and sur-
gical abortion providers, and demands that both meet ambulatory surgical
center standards, effectively creates the same undue burden of eliminated
access to abortion services.  If, however, some clinics in the state remain able
to meet the ambulatory surgical center requirements, it is possible that an
undue burden challenge will fail.  The extent to which federal courts will
take cost and geography into account when making undue burden judg-
ments remains unclear and will largely depend on whether the Supreme
Court adopts the approaches of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, taking into
account these practical factors, or adheres to the Fourth Circuit’s rejection of
such factors serving as the basis of an undue burden.  In the event that the
Court is willing to take into account more pragmatic factors, it seems likely
that legislation imposing a uniform requirement that all abortion clinics—
regardless of the nature and type of procedure performed—meet ambula-
tory surgical center standards will not survive constitutional scrutiny.
Cost and geographic concerns are more acute in some states than
others.  For instance, in Texas, availability of clinics may greatly affect a
woman’s decision to obtain an abortion in light of the state’s substantial
geography.  On July 18, 2013, Texas Governor Rick Perry signed into law
House Bill 2, which amends the State Health and Safety Code as follows: “On
and after September 1, 2014, the minimum standards for an abortion facility
must be equivalent to the minimum standards adopted under Section
243.010 for ambulatory surgical centers.”93
Different groups of clinics brought two separate lawsuits challenging
particular provisions of House Bill 2.  First, on September 27, 2013 a consor-
tium of reproductive rights groups—the Center for Reproductive Rights,
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, American Civil Liberties Union,
and American Civil Liberties Union of Texas—filed suit against Texas Attor-
ney General Greg Abbott on behalf of several women’s health and abortion
providers.94  Although House Bill 2 contained four comprehensive restric-
tions on abortion access, these plaintiffs challenged only the requirements
that physicians obtain admitting privileges at local hospitals and that medica-
tion abortions follow the FDA-approved label use (as opposed to the widely
91 Stenberg, 530 U.S. 914.
92 Id. at 938–39, 945–46.
93 H.B. 2, 83d Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2013).
94 Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp.
2d 891, 891 (W.D. Tex. 2013), rev’d in part, 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014); accord Jordan
Smith, Abortion Rights Lawsuit Filed Against State of Texas, AUSTIN CHRON., Oct. 4, 2013,
http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2013-10-04/abortion-rights-lawsuit-filed-against-
state-of-texas/.
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used, off-label use).95  Analysts estimate that the “expensive updates to
[clinic] facilities” that House Bill 2 requires “would force 90 percent of the
state’s clinics to close their doors . . . leav[ing] just five abortions clinics in
the entire Lone Star State.”96  More than forty clinics provided abortion ser-
vices in Texas prior to the enactment of House Bill 2; by late October 2013,
approximately half of those clinics closed in response to new requirements
under House Bill 2.97  On October 28, 2013, the Western District of Texas
issued a permanent injunction against the admitting privileges require-
ment,98 but upheld the medication abortion provision.99  The Fifth Circuit
subsequently reversed the district court’s injunction on grounds that the
State of Texas likely would succeed on the merits in proving the provision’s
95 Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 895–96; accord Smith, supra note 94; Andrew Harris &
David Montgomery, Texas Abortion Laws Will Close Clinics, Witness Testifies, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
22, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-21/texas-abortion-restric
tions-tested-at-trial-in-austin.html.
96 Tara Culp-Ressler, What the Mainstream Media Misses About Texas’ Ongoing Abortion
Battle, THINKPROGRESS (Jul. 3, 2013, 2:25 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/07/
03/2253921/texas-ongoing-abortion-battle/; see also Laura Bassett, Anti-Abortion Laws Take
Dramatic Toll on Clinics Nationwide, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 26, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/26/abortion-clinic-closures_n_3804529.html (discuss-
ing abortion clinic closures nationwide and showing a map of the percentage changes in
abortion clinic numbers between 2010 and 2013).
97 Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, No. 1:14-CV-284-LY, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
124500, at *13 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2014).
98 The Western District of Texas emphasized the two-step analytical process, under
Casey, with which a court must engage: (1) whether there is a rational basis between the
regulation and the legitimate state interest, and (2) whether such restriction places an
undue burden on the decision to obtain an abortion, taking into account the “real pur-
pose” behind the regulation. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 898–99.  The court struck down the
admitting privileges requirement due to the State’s failure to prove there existed a rational
basis for the regulation. Id. at 899–900 (holding, under the undue burden standard, that
“[a] lack of admitting privileges on the part of an abortion provider is of no consequence
when a patient presents at a hospital emergency room.  By law, no hospital can refuse to
provide emergency care.”).  Further, even if the State provided a rational basis, the law
would still fail on grounds that it created an undue burden by forcing many clinics to close.
Id. at 900 (“By requiring abortion providers to have hospital admitting privileges, the evi-
dence is that there will be abortion clinics that will close.  The record reflects that 24 coun-
ties in the Rio Grande Valley would be left with no abortion provider because those
providers do not have admitting privileges and are unlikely to get them.”).
99 The court determined that the undue burden threshold was not met in the chal-
lenge to the requirement that medication abortion be performed only in conformity with
FDA approval, despite widespread off-label use that the court found to be a “safe and effec-
tive procedure.” Id. at 906; accord id. at 907 (“At some point, the totality of incidental
effects may become an undue burden.  However, the record before the court, when viewed
through the prism of the Supreme Court’s controlling precedent, establishes that thresh-
old has not been met.”).  The court noted, however, that the states may not restrict abor-
tions deemed necessary by a physician in order to preserve the life of the mother, and
therefore, the medication abortion provision of House Bill 2 does not apply to physicians
who deem an abortion necessary for that reason. Id. at 908–09.
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constitutionality.100  The Fifth Circuit specifically noted that the anticipated
closure of clinics failing to meet the physician admitting requirement did not
constitute an undue burden, despite some patients’ anticipated increased
travel of nearly 150 miles.101  The Supreme Court denied an emergency
application to block the law from going into effect.102
In a second lawsuit, a separate group of plaintiffs challenged House Bill
2’s hospital admitting privileges requirement as applied to particular clinics,
and brought a facial challenge against the ambulatory surgical center
requirement.  Despite the Fifth Circuit’s reversal in the first lawsuit, the
potential closure of multiple abortion clinics across Texas led district court
Judge Lee Yeakel to rule on August 29, 2014 that House Bill 2’s ambulatory
surgical center requirement imposed an undue burden on a woman’s deci-
sion to obtain an abortion.103  In reaching this decision, the court took par-
ticular note of the geographic burden placed on women in Texas seeking an
abortion: “[A]fter September 1, 2014, approximately 2 million women will
live further than 50 miles [from an abortion clinic], 1.3 million further than
100 miles, 900,0000 further than 150 miles, and 750,000 further than 200
miles.”104  Even assuming the remaining seven or eight clinics in the state
could accommodate all those requesting their services, Judge Yeakel
explained, the ambulatory surgical center requirement still constituted an
undue burden because the reduced number of clinics, in combination with
pragmatic factors attending access, created a “de facto barrier” to obtaining an
abortion for a substantial portion of those women who might otherwise seek
one.105  Judge Yeakel highlighted several potential impediments to clinic
access: “lack of availability of child care, unreliability of transportation,
unavailability of appointments at abortion facilities, unavailability of time off
from work, immigration status and inability to pass border checkpoints, pov-
erty level, the time and expense involved in traveling long distances, and
other, inarticulable psychological obstacles.”106  Even if increased travel up
to 150 miles might not alone constitute an undue burden, the court rea-
soned that increased travel plus unique travel concerns rises to the level of an
undue burden on the decision to obtain an abortion.107
100 748 F.3d 583, 605 (5th Cir. 2014).
101 Id. at 597–98.
102 134 S. Ct. 506 (2013); see Carolyn Jones, Texas’ Anti-Abortion Law Lands at Supreme
Court, TEXAS OBSERVER (Nov. 4, 2013, 12:44 PM), http://www.texasobserver.org/fifth-cir-
cuit-unblocks-texas-abortion-law-clinics-expected-close/; Adam Liptak, Justices Reject Bid to
Block Texas Law on Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/
20/us/supreme-court-rejects-bid-to-block-texas-abortion-law.html.
103 Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, No. 1:14-CV-284-LY, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124500
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2014).
104 Id. at *15.
105 Id. at *19.
106 Id.
107 See id. at *18–19 (“The State argues that the Fifth Circuit has established a de facto
‘safe harbor’ of 150 miles and that no abortion regulation that increases travel distance
alone could act as an undue burden on the right to previability abortion.  But here, the
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On an emergency appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s
ruling.108  After acknowledging the ambiguity surrounding the proper facial
challenge standard for abortion legislation, the Fifth Circuit found that the
lower court failed to apply either the Salerno “no set of circumstances” or the
Casey “large fraction” standard.109  Instead, the district court inappropriately
focused on the increased number of women of reproductive age in Texas
who would need to drive further to reach a clinic, and then employed a bal-
ancing test in which it weighed the severity of the burden against the legiti-
mate state interests.110  If the district court had applied the “large fraction”
standard, the Fifth Circuit explained, it would have needed to determine how
many women seeking abortions would need to drive more than 150 miles to
access a clinic, rather than look to the number of women in general.111  Even
assuming, arguendo, both that 150 miles provided a relevant cutoff for the
analysis and that all 900,000 women living in excess of 150 miles from a clinic
did seek an abortion, the Fifth Circuit still found the “large fraction” stan-
dard unsatisfied; an affected population of 900,000 out of 5.4 million women
of reproductive age meant only 16.7% of the population faced an undue
burden.112  The Fifth Circuit found additional practical factors affecting
clinic access—child care, transportation, work conflicts, etc.—irrelevant to
the analysis, as it read Casey to require that the law itself cause the undue
burden if it is to be held unconstitutional.113  Under this rationale, the court
indicated, extralegislative factors have no place in the undue burden calcula-
tion.  Consequently, the Fifth Circuit upheld the ambulatory surgical center
requirement on grounds that the State had shown a likelihood of success that
the requirement was facially valid.114
The Supreme Court subsequently halted House Bill 2 from taking effect
pending the Fifth Circuit’s final ruling on the law’s constitutionality.115
record conclusively establishes that increased travel distances combine with practical con-
cerns unique to every woman.  These factors combine with increased travel distances to
establish a de facto barrier to obtaining an abortion for a large number of Texas women of
reproductive age who might choose to seek a legal abortion.” (citations omitted)).
108 See Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 296 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding
House Bill 2’s hospital admitting privileges requirement and the ambulatory surgical
center requirement constitutional).
109 Id. at 296.
110 Id. at 296–97.
111 See id. at 298.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 299.  The court also deemed irrelevant the law’s incidental effect of increasing
the cost to obtain an abortion. Id. at 300 (“[A]s the Supreme Court recognized in Carhart,
and we observed in Abbott I, ‘[t]he fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not
designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or
more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott,
734 F.3d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 2013))).
114 Id. at 293–94, 300.
115 See Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, No. 14A365, 2014 WL 5148719, at *1 (U.S.
Oct. 14, 2014).
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Although the Court provided no analysis for its order, lawyers arguing on
behalf of the affected clinics “had said that clinics closed as a result probably
would not reopen,”116 which may have influenced the Court’s decision, given
the threat of irreparable harm.  Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas dissented,
stating they would deny the application in full.117  Returning the case for full
constitutional evaluation will give the Fifth Circuit an opportunity to explain
further what factors should be included in the undue burden calculation.
Clinic closures resulting from the impossibility of meeting ambulatory
surgical center standards in the dictated timeline also could constitute an
undue burden on a woman’s decision to obtain an abortion.  The costs of
transforming a clinic to meet ambulatory surgical center standards are sub-
stantial.  Experts testifying in the recent Texas district court decision esti-
mated the cost of renovating an existing clinic would likely exceed $1.5
million, and the cost of building an entirely new clinic would be in excess of
$3 million.118  Those figures may be understated.  Bloomberg News reported
that most clinics will not be able to afford the cost of transforming their facili-
ties to meet the new standards.119  For independent clinics that operate at
narrow profit margins, or often at a loss, the concept of building a single
“new surgical center with four operating rooms . . . [for] $6 million to $8
million”120 is unfathomable.121  More importantly, saving and/or raising the
necessary funds to upgrade building facilities in the required timeline likely
will be impossible for many clinics.  For others, cost is irrelevant because the
abortion clinic’s facilities are rented, thereby entirely precluding the option
of remodeling to meet regulatory requirements.122
116 Lyle Denniston, Court Blocks Abortion Limits in Texas, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 14, 2014,
7:08 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/10/court-blocks-abortion-limits-in-texas/;
accord ASSOCIATED PRESS, Supreme Court Blocks Parts of Texas Abortion Law, FOX NEWS (Oct.
14, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/10/14/supreme-court-blocks-parts-tex
as-abortion-law/; Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Blocks Texas Abortion Law, WASH. POST, Oct.
14, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-blocks-tex
as-abortion-law/2014/10/14/a3c51252-53ad-11e4-892e-602188e70e9c_story.html; Adam
Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Texas Abortion Clinics to Stay Open, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/us/supreme-court-allows-texas-abortion-clinics-to-
stay-open.html.
117 Whole Woman’s Health, 2014 WL 5148719, at *1.
118 Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, No. 1:14-CV-284-LY, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
124500, at *16–17 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2014); see also Tara Culp-Ressler, Court Ruling Devas-
tates Texas’ Abortion Clinic Infrastructure, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 3, 2014, 11:02 AM), http://
thinkprogress.org/health/2014/10/03/3575477/court-ruling-texas-asc/.
119 See Esmé E. Deprez & David Mildenberg, Texas Abortion Clinics Need Million-Dollar
Fixes to Stay Open, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 15, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2013-07-15/texas-abortion-clinics-need-million-dollar-fixes-to-stay-open.html.
120 Id.
121 Lower estimates place renovations at only $2 million, but this is likely still too large a
figure for independent clinics, unaffiliated with larger entities like Planned Parenthood, to
afford. See Wlodek, supra note 16, at 415.
122 Id.
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The Indiana and Texas laws dictate that all abortion clinics in the respec-
tive states meet the ambulatory surgical center requirement within an estab-
lished and aggressive timetable.  Texas’s legislation allowed only thirteen
months for clinics to raise the necessary funds, hire engineers and builders,
and perform the requisite facility changes in order to remain open to the
public.123  Even more aggressively, Indiana’s legislation allowed only nine
months to finance, complete all physical renovations, and meet ambulatory
surgical center standards.124
The aggressive and perhaps unrealistic timelines these statutes impose
are likely to reduce the number of clinics available to perform abortions in
such proportions as to create an undue burden on women desiring to obtain
an abortion.  In this regard, the travel requirements will be more onerous
and the cost associated with that travel will increase the overall expenditure
necessary to obtain an abortion.  Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether
courts will consistently consider availability and cost when evaluating the bur-
den such legislation imposes.
B. Is There a Rational Basis?
Whether the states have a rational basis for requiring that abortion clin-
ics meet the same facility standards as ambulatory surgical centers largely
depends on the type of abortion being performed at the clinic.  Importantly,
not all abortion clinics offer both medication and surgical abortion proce-
dures.  Indeed, the imposition of ambulatory surgical center standards on
abortion clinics that provide surgical procedures likely will be held to be
rational, but that same logical inference is missing with respect to clinics that
perform abortions through nonsurgical procedures.  Accordingly, even if the
Supreme Court adopts the most deferential standard of review, the imposi-
tion of an ambulatory surgical center requirement on clinics performing only
nonsurgical abortions may be invalidated because there is likely no rational
relation between increased patient safety during nonsurgical procedures and
the imposition of surgical center standards on clinics.
Ambulatory surgical centers provide a wide range of services for patients
that do not require overnight hospital stays.  According to the National Sur-
vey of Ambulatory Surgery (NSAS), the five most utilized services performed
at ambulatory surgical centers are endoscopy of the large intestine, endos-
copy of the small intestine, extraction of lens, injection of agent into spinal
canal, and insertion of prosthetic lens.125  Additional available services at
ambulatory surgical centers include operation on muscle, tendon, fascia, and
bursa; tonsillectomy with or without adenoidectomy; adenoidectomy with or
123 See H.B. 2, 83d Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2013).
124 See S.B. 371, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013).
125 Karen A. Cullen et al., Ambulatory Surgery in the United States, 2006, NAT’L HEALTH
STATISTICS REPORTS 1 (Sept. 4, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr011.pdf.
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without tonsillectomy; injections of prophylactic substances; and endoscopic
polypectomy.126
The risks attending these procedures generally are not extreme.  Tonsil-
lectomy and adenoidectomy procedures involve the surgical removal of
either the tonsils or adenoid glands, and recovery is complete in seven to
fourteen days.127  The risks associated with these surgeries are not life threat-
ening, and include bleeding, infection, or injury to the soft palate.128  Simi-
larly, endoscopy of the upper intestine carries with it minimal risks, including
bleeding (sometimes requiring a blood transfusion), infection, or “tearing of
the gastrointestinal tract” (occurring in “an estimated 3 to 5 of every 10,000
diagnostic upper endoscopies”).129  Endoscopy of the lower intestine carries
the same risks of bleeding, infection, or potential perforation.130
Other, more invasive surgeries also take place at ambulatory surgical
centers.  These include a variety of different plastic surgeries, including
liposuction; biopsies of lymph nodes, breast tissue, liver, muscle, and tempo-
ral arteries; urological services; gynecological services, including dilation and
curretage; ear, nose, and throat surgeries; and orthopedic surgeries.131  The
risks associated with these surgeries are generally much higher than the less
invasive procedures.  Potential complications with liposuction, for example,
include infection, embolism, puncture wounds in organs, seroma (pooling of
serum where tissue was removed), swelling, skin necrosis, burns, fluid imbal-
ance, toxicity from anesthesia, or even death (3 in every 100,000 cases).132  In
many ways, surgical abortion appears to have the same characteristics as the
126 Id. at 6.  This is not intended to be an exhaustive list. See infra note 131 and accom-
panying text.
127 Adenoid Removal, MEDLINE PLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/arti-
cle/003011.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2014); Tonsillectomy, MEDLINE PLUS, http://www
.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/003013.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
128 Tonsillectomy, supra note 127; Adenoid Removal, supra note 127.
129 Upper Endoscopy: Risks, MAYO CLINIC (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.mayoclinic.com/
health/endoscopy/MY00138/DSECTION=risks.
130 G. Jechart & H. Messmann, Indications and Techniques for Lower Intestinal Endoscopy,
PUBMED, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18790432 (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
131 Abbott Northwestern Hospital: Ambulatory Surgery Center, ALLINA HEALTH, http://www
.allinahealth.org/ahs/anw.nsf/page/ambsurctr (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).  The ambula-
tory surgical center at the Abbott Northwestern Hospital performs the following surgeries:
abdominoplasty; breast augmentation; chin augmentation; dermabrasion; liposuction; mel-
anoma excision; skin grafts; varicose vein ligation; biopsies of lymph nodes, breast tissue,
liver, muscle, temporary artery; hernia repairs; wound debridement; porta cath removal;
cystoscopy; bladder biopsy; needle biopsy of prostate; adult circumcision; vasectomy;
colposcopy; dilation and curettage (D&C); tubal dye studies; hysteroscopy; vaginal biop-
sies; nasal cautery; septoplasty; rhinoplasty; closed reduction nasal fracture; joint manipula-
tions; bunion removal; close reductions; hardware removal; and cyst excisions. Id. (listing
available procedures under expandable sections in center of page).
132 What Are the Risks or Complications?, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/SurgeryandLifeSupport/Liposuction/
ucm256139.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2014) (discussing the risks and complications associ-
ated with liposuction).
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less risk-laden surgical procedures.  An aspiration surgical abortion, per-
formed during the first six to sixteen weeks of pregnancy, involves adminis-
tration of a local anesthetic to the cervix, the placement of rods inside the
cervix to induce dilation, and the insertion of a cannula into the uterus to
“suction out the fetus and placenta.”133  This surgery appears very similar in
nature to the adenoidectomy procedure, in which the surgeon inserts a small
tool to keep the patient’s mouth open, removes the glands using a curette
(small cutting device), and then relies on electrocautery, coblation, or other
absorbent material to control the bleeding.134  The aspiration abortion sur-
gery takes very little time, and recovery time is only a few hours.135  The other
type of surgical abortion is dilation and evacuation (D&E), which occurs
when the pregnancy is more than sixteen weeks in progress.136  The proce-
dure involves the placement of rods inside the cervix, often one day in
advance, to induce dilation.137  The physician then administers a numbing
agent to the cervix, utilizes additional rods or tenaculum to induce further
dilation, and makes a series of passes with a cannula and curette to remove
fetal tissue from the uterus.138  General anesthesia is used on occasion with
the D&E procedure.139  The procedure concludes with “a final suctioning to
make sure the contents are completely removed.”140  The D&E procedure
takes approximately twice as long as the aspiration abortion, generally lasting
fifteen to thirty minutes,141 but recovery time remains minimal.142
Both the aspiration and D&E procedures incur several potential risks.
By choosing to undergo a surgical abortion, the patient risks “damage to the
womb or cervix; uterine perforation (accidentally putting a hole in the uterus
with one of the instruments used); excessive bleeding; infection of the uterus
or fallopian tubes; scarring of the inside of the uterus; [or] reaction to the
133 Surgical Abortion Procedures: Aspiration, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, http://american-
pregnancy.org/unplannedpregnancy/surgicalabortions.html (last updated Feb. 2014).
This procedure is also known as a “suction aspiration, suction curettage, or vacuum aspira-
tion.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
134 Adenoid Removal, supra note 127.
135 Surgical abortion performed using the aspiration method takes approximately
10–15 minutes to complete, with recovery lasting a few hours. Surgical Abortion Procedures:
Aspiration, supra note 133.





139 Warren M. Hern, Second-Trimester Surgical Abortion, in 6 GYNECOLOGY AND OBSTETRICS
ch. 125 (John J. Sciarra ed., rev. ed. 2002), available at http://www.drhern.com/pdfs/
secondsurg.pdf.
140 Surgical Abortion Procedures: Dilation & Evacuation (D&E), supra note 136.
141 Id.
142 See Abortion—Surgical, MEDLINE PLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/
article/002912.htm (last updated Nov. 21, 2012) (noting that the recovery period is “a few
hours”).
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medicines or anesthesia, such as trouble breathing.”143  However, these risks
are recognized to “rarely occur.”144  Death occurs in 0.0006% of all legal
surgical abortions,145 with the greatest likelihood attending second-trimester
abortion, since risk correlates with the length of the pregnancy.146
The courts likely will conclude that state legislators have a rational basis
for believing similar surgical procedures should be performed in equivalently
equipped facilities, particularly in light of the state’s legitimate interest in
ensuring maternal health.  Surgical abortion procedures utilize some of the
same tools and parallel techniques as other procedures currently performed
in ambulatory surgical centers.  Further, the risks attending surgical abortion,
either by aspiration or D&E, echo those presented in some of the less risky
procedures currently subject to ambulatory service facility requirements.  It
also is perhaps a logical extension of Mazurek v. Armstrong147 to argue that if
states have wide latitude to regulate who may perform an abortion, the state
likely also retains authority to dictate the requirements for the facilities in
which abortions are performed.148  The strength of the state’s interest in
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 See Genevra Pittman, Abortion Safer than Giving Birth: Study, REUTERS (Jan 23, 2012,
5:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/23/us-abortion-idUSTRE80M2BS
20120123 (noting that “between 1998 and 2005, one woman died during childbirth for
every 11,000 or so babies born” while only “one woman of every 167,000 . . . died from a
legal abortion”).
146 The “rare, [although] possible[,] complications” resulting from second-trimester
surgical abortions include “a blood clot in the uterus that can cause pain or require a
repeat aspiration; infection, which is generally easily identified and treated; a tear in the
cervix that can be easily repaired with suture; perforation; retained pregnancy tissue
requiring repeat aspiration; and excessive bleeding requiring a transfusion.” Surgical Abor-
tion (Second Trimester), UCSF MED. CTR., http://www.ucsfhealth.org/treatments/surgical_
abortion_second_trimester/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).  Second-trimester abortions are
necessarily surgical, as the FDA only approved medication abortion for abortions that
occur within forty-nine days of fertilization. Mifeprex (Mifepristone) Information, FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/postmarketdrugsafetyinformationfor
patientsandproviders/ucm111323.htm (last updated July 19, 2011).  While it is true that
there have been several deaths reported in connection with the use of mifepristone and
misoprostol, FDA investigations could not determine a causal link between the use of the
drugs and the sepsis that resulted in the deaths.  While noting these deaths on its disclo-
sure page, the FDA states plainly that it “do[es] not know whether using mifepristone and
misoprostol caused these deaths.” Id.; see also Heather D. Boonstra, Medication Abortion
Restrictions Burden Women and Providers—and Threaten U.S. Trend Toward Very Early Abortion,
GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Winter 2013, at 18, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/
pubs/gpr/16/1/gpr160118.html (noting the lack of a causal link between medication
abortion drugs and the deaths).
147 520 U.S. 968 (1997).
148 In Mazurek, the Supreme Court upheld a Montana statute that restricted the per-
formance of abortions to licensed physicians on grounds that the plaintiffs “had [neither]
established any likelihood of prevailing on their claim that the law imposed an ‘undue
burden’ within the meaning of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,” id. at 970,
nor provided any evidence that the Montana legislature had the “improper legislative pur-
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ensuring maternal health, in combination with the similarity between surgi-
cal abortions and other surgical procedures currently performed at ambula-
tory surgical centers, creates a strong case that there is a rational basis for
state legislation requiring surgical abortions take place in facilities that meet
ambulatory surgical center standards.
At the same time, however, the lack of similarities between surgical pro-
cedures and medication-induced abortion make readily apparent the lack of
a rational basis for imposing ambulatory surgical center standards on clinics
not providing surgical abortion services.  Medication-induced abortion
requires no anesthesia, no invasion of the body cavity, and no in-clinic stays.
Rather, the procedure requires dispensing two medications, and a follow-up
appointment.149  The patient takes the “abortion pill” (mifepristone) while
at the clinic, and is then sent home with a second pill (misoprostol) to be
taken twenty-four to forty-eight hours later.150  The second pill causes cramps
and heavy bleeding as the uterine lining breaks down and the pregnancy
terminates.151  There is no official recovery time; most women’s bleeding
lasts four or five hours, although for some the abortion takes up to a few days
to complete.152  A follow-up appointment is necessary to ensure the abortion
was successful and there are no recognized complications.153  In light of the
fact that women who obtain medication to induce abortion do not stay in the
clinic while the abortion occurs, the imposition of surgical center standards
on these clinics would not further maternal safety, and therefore such legisla-
tion likely would fail even rational basis analysis.
C. Inability to Obtain State Licenses Even Upon Meeting Requirements
Beyond the question of whether ambulatory surgical center standards
should apply to abortion clinics, there remains concern that abortion clinics
will not be able to obtain the requisite state licenses even upon meeting those
standards.  Importantly, the Simopoulos Court based its decision on the pre-
mise that there was “no reason to doubt that an adequately equipped clinic
could, upon proper application, obtain an outpatient hospital license permit-
pose” of intending to “interfere with the constitutionally protected right to abortion.” Id.
at 972.  The Court found the fact that “an antiabortion group” drafted the legislation
“[said] nothing significant about the legislature’s purpose in passing it.” Id. at 973.  The
Court concluded that even though there was no evidence suggesting a physician may per-
form the procedure more safely than a non-physician, the states retain “‘broad latitude to
decide that particular functions may be performed only by licensed professionals, even if an
objective assessment might suggest that those same tasks could be performed by others.’” Id. (quoting
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885 (1992)).
149 See The Abortion Pill, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparenthood.org/
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ting the performance of second-trimester abortions.”154  Contrary to this
assumption, some states became quite restrictive in granting licenses to clin-
ics that provide abortion services.
Such was the case in Mississippi in 2004.  In Jackson Women’s Health
Organization v. Amy,155 an abortion clinic sought injunctive relief from an
amendment to Mississippi state law that would require both first-trimester
and second-trimester abortions to be performed in a licensed hospital or
ambulatory surgical facility.156  The clinic sought injunctive relief because
the amendment would bar it from performing abortions from weeks thirteen
through fifteen, despite having performed such abortions for many years and
meeting the requisite criteria to be designated an ambulatory surgical facil-
ity.157  The court granted the injunctive relief, noting that “it appears from
the record that plaintiff does meet all the substantive standards for licen-
sure . . . and yet the State has made it plain that this plaintiff cannot obtain
the necessary license for reasons wholly unrelated to any . . . legitimate moti-
vation by the State.”158  The court pointed out that the Mississippi State
Department of Health required the clinic to seek certification as an ambula-
tory surgical center prior to applying for licensure, but since the clinic only
performed surgical abortions, it would fail the criteria to receive certification
and therefore would not receive a license.159  Therefore, the court
explained, the plaintiff’s specific specialty in surgical abortions rendered it
ineligible for state licensure, and prohibited it from performing second-tri-
mester abortions under the amendment.160  The abortion clinic did not chal-
lenge the ability of the State to regulate the health standards of facilities in
which second-trimester abortions are performed, but rather sought injunc-
tive relief on grounds that Mississippi applied its statute so as to bar perform-
ance of early second-trimester abortions for reasons unrelated to the
legitimate state interest in maternal health.161
These pragmatic concerns echo those present in the Eighth Circuit’s
opinion in Planned Parenthood of Minnesota/South Dakota v. Rounds, decided
just one month earlier.162  There, the Eighth Circuit held that a South
Dakota statute requiring all abortions after twelve weeks to be performed in a
hospital imposed an undue burden because there was no hospital in the state
available to perform abortions.163  In the absence of a Supreme Court ruling,
154 Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 518–19 (1983).
155 330 F. Supp. 2d 820 (S.D. Miss. 2004).
156 Id. at 822.
157 Despite meeting the substantive requirements, the clinic had not been able to
obtain official licensure as an ambulatory surgical center. Id. at 822, 824–25.
158 Id. at 824.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 825 n.4.
161 Id. at 823.
162 372 F.3d 969 (8th Cir. 2004).
163 Id. at 972 (“The plaintiffs’ complaint itself alleges that in South Dakota, abortions
are virtually unavailable in hospitals.  There is only one hospital—Sioux Valley Hospital—
that has reported to the State that abortions have been performed at their facilities.  Sioux
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however, the circuits will remain unguided and divided on the proper role
practical factors play in the Casey analysis.
Clinics in Ohio also faced difficulty obtaining the requisite state licen-
sure despite meeting the substantive facility requirements.  A recent state law
bans public hospitals—those in receipt of local government funds164—from
signing formal transfer agreements with local clinics, even though those clin-
ics are required by state law to obtain such agreements in order to receive
state licensure.165  Although it is still debated whether the formal agreements
themselves are necessary—given that clinic facilities are generally able to
handle complications and hospitals must accept emergency patients for treat-
ment—the new Ohio law will likely force several of the state’s remaining clin-
ics to close “because they cannot find willing partners.”166  As of late-August
2014, four of Ohio’s thirteen clinics ceased operations due to their inability
to procure a transfer agreement with a local hospital.167
III. WHO SHOULD REGULATE ABORTION?
In light of the legal framework in place, and the practical reality that
many state regulations have the effect of closing abortion clinics, it is unclear
that the current division of power between the federal and state governments
is the ideal solution.  Although there are many benefits to leaving abortion
regulation largely in the hands of the states, there are also significant detri-
ments, including the risk of disparate levels of access nationwide and the
potential that clinics in one state will prove safer than those in another state,
rendering some women subject to greater medical risks simply due to the
state in which they live.  This Part evaluates the benefits and detriments
Valley Hospital will allow abortions only under very limited circumstances, i.e., when the
woman’s life or health would be significantly endangered by continuing the pregnancy, or
when the fetus appears to have serious and uncorrectable medical conditions or genetic
disorder.  Plaintiffs’ first and second amended complaints contain the same allegations.
These pleadings also allege that Planned Parenthood’s Sioux Falls clinic is the only outpa-
tient clinic providing abortions in the state of South Dakota. The first and second
amended complaints allege that a South Dakota woman who is unable to secure an abor-
tion at Planned Parenthood must travel long distances out of state to obtain such medical
care.  These two allegations taken together must mean that there is no hospital that per-
forms abortions in South Dakota.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
164 Public Hospitals Decline Swiftly, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2005, http://www.washington-
times.com/news/2005/aug/16/20050816-102614-7824r/.
165 Erik Eckholm, With New Abortion Restrictions, Ohio Walks a Narrow Legal Line, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/10/us/with-new-abortion-restric
tions-ohio-walks-fine-line.html.
166 Id.
167 Cheryl Wetzstein, New Ohio Abortion Rules Close Decades-Old Clinic, WASH. TIMES, Aug.
21, 2014, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/aug/21/cincinnati-areas-last-abor
tion-clinic-closes-suppo/; see also Laura Bassett, Cincinnati Abortion Clinic Closes, Leaving
Access ‘Severely Endangered’ in Region, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 20, 2014, 3:12 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/20/ohio-abortion-clinic-closing_n_5695376.html.
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attending federal and state regulation of abortion, and ultimately offers a
third option for readers’ consideration: regulation by accreditation.
A. Congress Versus the States
Congressional efforts to regulate abortion since 1973 suggest Congress
could quell the current debate surrounding abortion clinic facility standards
through legislation.168  Perhaps the best evidence to support this approach is
the existence and continued viability of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of
2003.  Importantly, though, Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Gonzales makes
clear that the Court was not asked to address whether the Act is a valid regu-
lation under Congress’s commerce power.169  Accordingly, although there is
a potential constitutional challenge to federal legislation in this arena, where
the federal government has acted, it has done so with success.
1. Does the Commerce Power Cover Abortion?
Is Congress authorized to regulate abortion services under the Com-
merce Clause?  The answer seems to be “yes.”  Congressional regulatory
power under the Commerce Clause remains expansive.  Consider the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court in four major building blocks of modern Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence—United States v. Lopez,170 United States v.
Morrison,171 Gonzales v. Raich,172 and National Federation of Independent Business
168 Shortly after Roe, Congress began actively seeking to regulate abortion practices in
the form of (unsuccessful) constitutional amendments and federal statutes. SHIMABUKURO,
supra note 46, at 10 (noting that while, prior to Roe, “relatively few bills involving abortion
were introduced in either the House or the Senate . . . more than 1,000 separate legislative
proposals have been introduced” since 1973).  Congress never codified the Roe decision,
despite fervent legislative efforts during the 102nd, 103rd, and 110th Congresses, nor did it
succeed in passing a constitutional amendment reversing Roe. Id.; see also MCBRIDE, supra
note 46, at 182 (providing the text of the proposed Freedom of Choice Act of 1993, an
ultimately unsuccessful attempt “to put the guarantees of Roe into law through Congres-
sional action”).  Congress’s greatest achievements in federal regulation of abortion are
arguably the successful passage and continued vitality of the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 248 (2012)), and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105,
117 Stat. 1206 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012)).
169 550 U.S. 124, 169 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[W]hether the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 constitutes a permissible exercise of Congress’ power under the
Commerce Clause is not before the Court.  The parties did not raise or brief that issue; it is
outside the question presented; and the lower courts did not address it.”).
170 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (holding unconstitutional the Gun-Free School Zones Act,
on grounds that Congress cannot regulate noneconomic activities under the Commerce
Clause).
171 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (holding that the civil remedy provision of the Violence
Against Women Act is not a valid exercise of the Commerce Power, because Congress
cannot “regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s
aggregate effect on interstate commerce”).
172 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (holding constitutional the Controlled Substances Act
because Congress’s commerce power extends to cover those purely local activities for
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v. Sebelius (NFIB),173 which effectively tethered regulations of purely intra-
state activity to a series of line-drawing exercises.  Today, it is understood that
Congress may regulate any one of three categories: channels of interstate
commerce, instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and those local activi-
ties having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.174  For this last cate-
gory, the broadest of the three, the Court specifically asks whether the
regulation “substantially affects interstate commerce.”175  In addition, per
Lopez and Morrison, the regulation must be “economic” in nature.176  Lastly,
per NFIB, it must govern “activity,” as opposed to “inactivity.”177
Abortion likely may be regulated by Congress as either an instrumental-
ity of interstate commerce or as a local activity having a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.  Numerous unsuccessful challenges to the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994178 (FACE) suggest that abortion itself
is the type of activity subject to Commerce Clause regulation as a local activity
that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.179  Those circuits
upholding the constitutionality of FACE180 did so on grounds that the regu-
lated activity—protesting outside clinic facilities—had a substantial effect on
which Congress has a rational basis for believing is part of a “class of activities” that, in the
aggregate, will have a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
173 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586; accord id. at 2585–91 (2012) (noting that the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act of 2010 was not a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce
power because Congress may not regulate inactivity, and the failure to purchase health
insurance, creating the cost-shifting problem that the individual mandate seeks to correct,
is inactivity).
174 See Laura J. Tepich, Note, Gonzales v. Carhart: The Partial Termination of the Right to
Choose, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 339, 346 (2008) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59).
175 Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559) (internal quotation marks omitted).
176 See supra notes 170–71.
177 See supra note 173 and accompanying parenthetical text.
178 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2012).
179 Tepich, supra note 174, at 354 (quoting Jordan Goldberg, Note, The Commerce Clause
and Federal Abortion Law: Why Progressives Might Be Tempted to Embrace Federalism, 75 FORDHAM
L. REV. 301, 327 (2006)).
180 The First Circuit has not yet addressed this issue.  The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits upheld FACE as a valid exercise of
Congress’s Commerce Clause power.  United States v. Bird, 401 F.3d 633, 634 (5th Cir.
2005); Norton v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 547, 559 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Gregg, 226
F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Weslin, 156 F.3d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 1998);
Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 589 (4th Cir. 1997); Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1413–14
(D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 920–21 (8th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 688 (7th Cir. 1995); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520–21
(11th Cir. 1995).
District Courts in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits also upheld FACE as a valid exercise of
the Commerce Clause power.  Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v.
Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 945 F. Supp. 1355, 1375 (D. Or. 1996); United States v. Lucero,
895 F. Supp. 1421, 1423 (D. Kan. 1995); United States v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1423, 1434
(C.D. Cal. 1995); Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 708 (D. Ariz. 1994); Council for Life
Coal. v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1431 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
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interstate commerce.181  FACE also withstood challenges after Lopez and Mor-
rison, asserting that the regulated activity was not economic in nature.  The
circuit courts held that “the fact that the activity [of protesting] was aimed at
preventing or threatening commerce made the statute sufficiently related to
‘economic activity’ to fall within Congress’s power.”182  Inherent in these rul-
ings is the concept that abortion constitutes “economic activity.”183  This is a
logical conclusion.  The act of an abortion is necessarily economic, as it is a
service procured for a fee.  Planned Parenthood places the cost of a medica-
tion-induced abortion at approximately $300 to $800,184 with higher costs
attending surgical abortions.185  Further, it readily satisfies the “activity”
requirement, as those who purchase the service (with the exception of
minors whose parents pay for abortion services on their behalf) must physi-
cally participate in the procedure; there is no ‘abstention’ quality to procur-
ing an abortion.  Those women who never become pregnant, or who become
pregnant and choose not to obtain an abortion, never interact with the abor-
tion “market,” and therefore do not detract from the designation of abortion
as an “activity.”
It is also possible that Congress has authority to regulate abortion under
its power to regulate the channels of interstate commerce.  This argument is
supported by the Court’s more recent decision in Raich.  There, the Supreme
Court upheld the Controlled Substances Act,186 which classified marijuana as
a controlled substance and thereby criminalized even local, noncommercial
consumption for medicinal purpose.  The Court reasoned that Congress has
the power “to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic
‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”187
Accordingly, as Jordan Goldberg hypothesizes, Congress could determine
that the “provision of abortions in one state[ ] [is] part of a class of economic
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce when
aggregated.”188
181 Tepich, supra note 174, at 353 (quoting Goldberg, supra note 179, at 334).
182 Id. (quoting Goldberg, supra note 179, at 334) (internal quotation marks omitted).
183 The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits specifically stated that the provision of reproduc-
tive health services is an economic activity. Wilson, 73 F.3d at 683; Cheffer, 55 F.3d at
1520–21.  Even Judge Weiss, dissenting in the Third Circuit’s ruling that FACE was a
proper exercise of the Commerce Clause, “conceded that abortion services are commer-
cial.”  Goldberg, supra note 179, at 342 (discussing Gregg, 226 F.3d at 268 (Weiss, J.,
dissenting)).
184 The Abortion Pill, supra note 149.
185 In-Clinic Abortion Procedures, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparenthood
.org/health-topics/abortion/in-clinic-abortion-procedures-4359.asp (last visited Nov. 21,
2014); see also Surgical Abortion Fees, AFFILIATED MED. SERVS., http://www.affiliatedmedical-
services.com/en/surgical-abortion/fees (last visited Nov. 21, 2014) (identifying the cost of
a surgical abortion, beginning at six to twelve weeks, and progressing week by week
thereafter).
186 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10 (2005).
187 Id. at 17.
188 Goldberg, supra note 179, at 335.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-2\NDL210.txt unknown Seq: 31 30-DEC-14 14:14
2014] seeking  common  ground 905
Accordingly, federal legislation that created a uniform standard for
clinic facilities, based on a close nexus between the facility regulations and
legitimate maternal health concerns, most likely would constitute a valid
exercise of the Commerce Power because it would be in furtherance of
ensuring access, in all states, to the abortion market.189  Furthermore, given
that abortion access dictates the number of persons born in the country each
year, thereby affecting population needs and workforce growth, it seems
highly likely that the Court would find a rational basis exists for such
legislation.
2. Is Congress the Best Gatekeeper?
Practical realities create substantial skepticism of the viability of congres-
sional regulation of abortion facility standards.  Federal regulation of this
kind could eliminate the needless closure of clinics that provide abortion
services while simultaneously ensuring that those clinics meet uniform stan-
dards of health and safety.  The potential for such federal legislation, how-
ever, is de minimis.  Congress, as currently populated, is not likely to be able
to reach accord on such a politically charged issue.  Moreover, any legislation
put in place would be inherently unstable, as every new party majority might
easily overrule it.  Lastly, leaving to Congress so contentious a topic as abor-
tion may politicize the issue to the point that women’s health is no longer the
controlling concern.
The alternative path of leaving abortion regulation to the states initially
seems better for a number of reasons.  Most importantly, perhaps, abortion is
a topic on which few agree.  Even when we divide opinion into roughly two
camps—those who favor a right to choose versus those who do not—there
still exist factions within the two classifications.  In the absence of widespread
agreement, state governments are the ideal tinkers, and state experimenta-
tion should perhaps be recognized as a critical prerequisite to uniform fed-
eral regulation.  Moreover, leaving abortion regulation to the states ensures a
closer nexus between the state-citizens’ preferences concerning abortion
practices and the actual laws in force, as opposed to the distance that inevita-
bly develops at a federal level, where many different state populations’ prefer-
ences must be considered in the creation of uniformly applicable legislation.
At the same time, though, states already have spent millions of dollars
litigating abortion-related restrictions.  Despite economies still suffering from
189 The general public is likely long-familiar with the concept of an “abortion market.”
Specifically, “abortion industry” is the phrase most utilized in the media, often as a pejora-
tive, to describe collectively those physicians and clinics that provide abortion services. See,
e.g., Ryan Bomberger, The Abortion Industry Puts the Con in Control, LIFENEWS.COM (Oct. 17,
2013, 3:02 PM), http://www.lifenews.com/2013/10/17/the-abortion-industry-puts-the-
con-in-population-control/ (describing the abortion industry as a population control tool);
Matthew Clark, Media’s Abortion Distortion Plays into Abortion Industry’s Deception, AM. CTR.
FOR LAW & JUSTICE, http://aclj.org/media-abortion-distortion-plays-abortion-industry-
deception (last visited Nov. 21, 2014) (describing Planned Parenthood as the leader of the
abortion industry).
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the recession, many states are engaging in legal battles costing hundreds of
thousands of dollars.190  This litigation crowds court dockets and spends the
valuable tax dollars of all state citizens, irrespective of their interest in or
preferred outcome of the debate.  For example, Kansas “spent $769,000
defending its abortion limits between January 2011 and June of [2013], and
the total sum will almost certainly top $1 million, as the attorney general has
requested $500,000 more.”191  Such expenditures also often result in budget
cuts elsewhere, including in education, the arts, environmental protections,
and hunger-reduction projects for the elderly.192  Part of the impetus for
defending current abortion laws so vigorously may be the desire to reach the
Supreme Court, which the state hopes will seize the opportunity to overturn
Roe and Casey.  Christopher Mirakian dubbed this tactic the “Alabama
Plan”193 in light of Alabama Senator Hank Erwin’s cavalier statements that
the purpose of proposing a state statute criminalizing all abortions would be
that its enactment could generate the litigation necessary for the Supreme
Court to revert to its pre-1973 abortion jurisprudence.194  However, in light
of the Supreme Court’s resolute adherence to Roe in Casey, it is highly
unlikely this path will prove fruitful.  In the meantime, it ties up valuable state
resources and hurts the citizens of that state by reducing or eliminating fund-
ing in other areas.
B. Finding a Neutral Zone: Accreditation
As Dawn Johnson eloquently wrote in 2009, “ ‘[c]ommon ground’
instead of ‘compromise’ is a useful way of conceptualizing the organizing
principle that should guide constructive efforts to bridge the abortion
divide.”195  Johnson envisioned this approach through a “broader agenda
that empowers individuals both to prevent unwanted pregnancy and to
choose wanted childbearing through a range of government-supported pro-
grams for women and families.”196  However, in recognizing that the need
for abortion will never disappear, this Note suggests an alternate scheme that
remains engaged in the debate surrounding facility standards, rather than
relying exclusively on sexual health education and contraception.
190 Bryce Covert, Five States Spending Thousands to Defend Abortion Laws That Could Use the
Money Elsewhere, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 29, 2013, 3:35 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/econ
omy/2013/08/29/2552381/states-spending-thousands-defend-abortion-laws-money/.
191 Id.  Idaho, South Dakota, North Dakota, and Arkansas have similar spending
records defending abortion laws during the last ten to fifteen years. Id.
192 Id. (noting, as one example, that Kansas defunded the Kansas Arts Commission, cut
education spending, and eliminated an environmental protection program aimed at clean
water, all while pursuing expensive litigation in defense of its abortion laws).
193 Mirakian, supra note 23, at 219.
194 Id.
195 Dawn Johnson, “TRAP”ing Roe in Indiana and a Common-Ground Alternative, 118
YALE L.J. 1356, 1389 (2009).
196 Id.
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An independent accreditation agency might be the most viable means of
finding common ground in the abortion debate.  Currently, there exists an
independent, not-for-profit organization, the Joint Commission, which offers
accreditation and certification services to a range of more than 20,000 health
organizations.197  Although the Joint Commission already offers accredita-
tion to ambulatory surgical centers, the ambiguity surrounding whether all
abortion clinics should have to meet ambulatory surgical center standards
makes it inappropriate to immediately subject abortion clinics to those
accreditation requirements.  However, the Joint Commission is well situated
to establish a new set of facility standards to address surgical and medication
abortions, respectively.
Irrespective of whether a new accreditation agency or an existing one
fills this role, it is necessary to flesh out what an abortion clinic accreditation
agency would do and how it could further women’s health.  In theory, the
relationship between an accreditation agency and abortion clinics would
function in a fashion that parallels the relationship between the American
Bar Association (ABA) and American law schools.
1. An Example: The ABA
The ABA is a voluntary organization recognized by the United States
Department of Education under Title 34, Chapter VI, § 602 of the Code of
Federal Regulations as “the national agency for the accreditation of pro-
grams leading to the J.D. degree in the United States.”198  The ABA is a large
organization, with specific sub-sections that perform specialty functions.  The
Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar is the group within the
ABA that sets the official accreditation standards and deals with the process
of accreditation.199  The Code of Federal Regulation mandates that this Sec-
tion and the Council that approves all accreditations be legally separate from
the ABA itself.200  The Section itself is divided into three sub-committees: the
Accreditation Committee, Standards Review Committee, and Data Policy &
Collections Committee.201
The ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools
(ABA Standards) govern every accredited law school’s organization and
administration; program of legal education; faculty qualifications, size,
instructional roles, responsibilities, and professional environment; admis-
197 About the Joint Commission, JOINT COMM’N, http://www.jointcommission.org/about_
us/about_the_joint_commission_main.aspx (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
198 The Law School Accreditation Process, ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO
THE BAR 3 (Aug. 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
misc/legal_education/2013_revised_accreditation_brochure_web.authcheckdam.pdf (cit-
ing 34 C.F.R. § 602 (1988)).
199 About Us, ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, http://www
.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/about_us.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
200 The Law School Accreditation Process, supra note 198, at 3.
201 Id. at 4.
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sions; student services; library and information resources; and facilities.202
The process of ABA accreditation is quite involved.  A school must first apply
for provisional approval after at least one year’s operation.203  The ABA then
engages in a fact-finding site visit,204 after which it submits a report to an
Accreditation Committee, which holds a hearing and allows representatives
from the school to prove how the school satisfies all the ABA Standards.205
The Committee then makes a recommendation to the Council regarding
whether the school should obtain provisional approval status, based on
whether it determines the school is in “substantial compliance with each of
the [ABA] Standards.”206  A school obtains full approval once it has had pro-
visional approval for at least three years and demonstrates full—not simply
substantial—compliance with the ABA Standards.207  While in a state of pro-
visional approval, law schools are subject to close scrutiny and will receive site
visits from members at three different times during the provisional status, “in
years two, four, and five after provisional approval,” which result in reports
that the Accreditation Committee reviews.208  These reports create open
communication between the school and the ABA, allowing the Accreditation
Committee to cite needed corrections and raise any concerns it may have,
and for the school to address such concerns by making any necessary
corrections.209
Even once a school obtains accreditation, it is subject to subsequent
Committee oversight.  The school will undergo another “full site evaluation
in the third year after full approval, and then a full sabbatical site evaluation
every seven years.”210  In addition, each law school must submit an Annual
Questionnaire, which allows the ABA to collect data “regarding curriculum,
faculty, facilities, fiscal and administrative capacity, technology resources, stu-
dent profiles, bar passage rates, and student placement data.”211  In this way,
the ABA ensures compliance with its Standards while avoiding micromanage-
ment.  Despite these lengthy processes, law schools are incentivized to obtain
ABA-accreditation because all United States jurisdictions now permit gradu-
ates of ABA-accredited schools to sit for their bar exams.212
202 Standards, ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, http://www
.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/standards.html (last visited Nov. 21,
2014).
203 The Law School Accreditation Process, supra note 198, at 5.
204 All site evaluation visits are performed by a Site Team, which reports back to the
Accreditation Committee, and are specifically governed by a set of guidelines and rules.
For details, see id. at 10.
205 Id. at 6.
206 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
207 Id. at 7.
208 Id.
209 See id.
210 Id. at 8.
211 Id.
212 Frequently Asked Questions, ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/fre-
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2. Devising an Accreditation Agency for Abortion Providers
An accreditation agency promulgating the standards to which abortion
providers are held would be required to respond, at minimum, to five critical
tasks: (i) obtaining congressional approval, (ii) establishing a process for
accreditation, (iii) forming an unbiased accreditation committee, (iv) setting
the criteria governing accreditation, and (v) providing incentives for accredi-
tation.  The following sections seek to outline what such an agency might
look like, including its structure, division of tasks, and the ways in which such
an organization would further women’s health.213
3. Establishing a Structure
Ideally, the accreditation agency would be an independent, not-for-
profit organization that has congressional approval to offer accreditation ser-
vices to abortion clinics.  Congress itself should determine whether authoriza-
tion should be included in the Code of Federal Regulations, or if
authorization should depend on reevaluation on an established schedule.
For example, authorization could be contingent on a proven track record of
ensuring that accredited abortion clinics comply with the agency’s standards.
Other independent, not-for-profit agencies already exist in such a relation-
ship with Congress.214
The agency itself might conceivably consist of a National Council, as well
as fifty State Councils, under each of which operate two sub-committees: an
Accreditation Committee and a Compliance Committee.  The State Councils
could be responsible for managing the two sub-committees, as well as investi-
gating allegations of noncompliance and imposing sanctions for actual non-
compliance.  Each Accreditation Committee could be tasked with
responsibility for the process of provisional approval, and each Compliance
Committee could handle grants of full approval and ensure continuing com-
pliance.  The National Council could be tasked with setting the standards
quently_asked_questions.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2014) (“In many states, a person may
not sit for the bar examination unless that person holds a J.D. degree from an ABA-
approved law school.”).
213 This Note conceives of an accreditation agency that governs “abortion clinics” gen-
erally, but which would take into consideration the procedures performed at a clinic when
specifying facility requirements.  It is unclear how Congress might define this term.  This is
an important caveat in light of recent legislation that does not distinguish between abor-
tion clinics that provide surgical abortions and those that provide only medication abor-
tions. See supra Section II.A; infra subsection III.B.5.
214 For example, SoundExchange is the only independent, not-for-profit agency that
Congress authorized to administer statutory licenses and collect royalties on behalf of
sound recording copyright holders, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §§ 112, 114 (2012). Licensing
101, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/service-provider/licensing-101/
(last visited Nov. 21, 2014).  “The Copyright Royalty Board selects the Collective for each
term at the applicable proceeding.  SoundExchange is currently the only authorized Col-
lective, through 2015.”  Email from Alex Reed, Senior Specialist, Licensee Relations,
SoundExchange, Inc., to author (Oct. 31, 2013, 8:45 AM) (on file with author).
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that abortion clinic facilities must meet, handling all appeals from State
Council sanction decisions, and communicating directly with Congress.
An ideal National Council would be composed of qualified and reputa-
ble physicians who appreciate the respective risks attendant to medical and
surgical abortion.  The objective would be to formulate regulations premised
on furthering women’s health and safety—entirely separate from any politi-
cal agendas.  By utilizing qualified physicians to address health concerns, the
resulting regulations are likely to be appropriate in scope and include
requirements that will ensure safe procedures and safeguards in the event of
a complication.
The composition of State Councils should mirror that of the National
Council, a panel of reputable physicians.  This neutrality and emphasis on
medical expertise would be particularly critical in these higher-level oversight
positions, which set the tone of the agency.  The National Council, itself fil-
led with medical experts, could select the State Council members.  In turn,
the State Council members could select those to serve on its Accreditation
and Compliance Committees.  The number of people on the State Council,
Accreditation Committee, and Compliance Committee would likely vary in
response to the number of clinics in each state, which would dictate the
extent of personnel required for proper oversight.
4. Establishing a Process for Accreditation
Although it is true that law schools and medical facilities are quite differ-
ent, the intricate ABA accreditation process provides a promising framework
for a theoretical abortion clinic accreditation process.  Importantly, ABA
accreditation bifurcates the approval process into two distinct steps: provi-
sional approval, during which the greatest amount of scrutiny occurs, and
full approval, during which continued, but less frequent, oversight takes
place.
Recognizing that the ABA does not have to deal with medical safety
interests, the ABA provisional approval step requires three adjustments to fit
the context of an abortion clinic accreditation agency.  First, the abortion
clinic accreditation process should likely begin ex ante, prior to receipt of
any patients, rather than following the ABA ex post model, waiting until after
at least one year of operation.  In addition, the ABA model should likely be
revised to only allow an abortion clinic to receive provisional approval if in
full compliance with the accreditation standards, not merely substantial com-
pliance.  Lastly, in light of the fact that these two prior changes shift the
burden onto the abortion clinic, the accreditation agency could be made to
bear the burden of proving a clinic is not in compliance with the standards,
rather than demanding the clinic also bear the burden of proving compli-
ance.  This arrangement strikes a balance of burdens between the two parties
without compromising patient safety.
The remainder of the provisional approval process for the ABA maps
well onto a theoretical abortion clinic accreditation agency’s potential pro-
cess.  After receipt of an application for provisional approval, the Accredita-
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tion Committee could assign a representative to perform a fact-finding site
visit, after which the representative would then submit a report to the Accred-
itation Committee.  The Committee would need to convene regularly to
review applications and make decisions.  In order to match the abortion
clinic’s interest in efficient Committee deliberation, the Committee should
also have the discretion to amend the procedure’s timeline in order to
ensure it accounts for the demand for clinic oversight.  Upon receipt of pro-
visional approval, the abortion clinic would be permitted to open its doors to
patients.
Also similar to the ABA accreditation process, abortion clinics would still
be subject to substantial oversight during the time they have provisional
approval.  Accreditation Committee members would perhaps perform
annual site visits, slightly more frequent than the ABA process but at sched-
uled times, thereby eliminating the concept of warrantless searches.215  This
again strikes a balance, furthering women’s health by ensuring facilities are
meeting the established standards, while simultaneously guaranteeing that
oversight is not performed in a manner akin to harassment.
Even once a clinic obtains official accreditation, it could remain subject
to subsequent Compliance Committee oversight and undergo site-evalua-
tions at a scheduled time and date.  At any time, however, patients should be
able to file noncompliance complaints with the State Council, which could,
at its discretion, launch an investigation of the clinic to ensure full compli-
ance with the agency’s standards.  The State Council would also have the
power of imposing sanctions on noncompliant clinics, up to and including
revocation of accreditation.  However, all State Council decisions would be
subject to appeal to the National Council.
5. Setting the Criteria Governing Accreditation
As a preliminary move in setting the standards to which abortion clinics
will be held, the National Council should bifurcate the standards into those
that govern clinics performing surgical and nonsurgical abortions, and those
governing clinics that only provide nonsurgical abortions.  This division is
critical in light of over-breadth challenges already undergoing judicial review
today.216  This separation alone will go far in ensuring facility standards are
closely tied to the interest in promoting women’s health.
The National Council should look to the NAF and Planned Parenthood
guidelines to see what facility and training requirements those national feder-
ations require their clinics to possess.  Simultaneously, the Council should
look to current state guidelines for comparison and debate as to whether
those regulations are sufficiently tightly connected to an interest in women’s
health to satisfy all parties.
215 See generally Jorns, supra note 15 (discussing TRAP laws that allow for effectively
warrantless searches of abortion clinic facilities).
216 For a discussion of the lawsuit filed by Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Ken-
tucky, see supra Section II.A.
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Although this Note focused its efforts on ensuring that facility regula-
tions promoted by an accreditation agency would be closely tied to the legiti-
mate interest in women’s health, it is possible that standards for other aspects
of clinic regulation—qualification requirements for those performing abor-
tions and general staff training, for example—could be developed by the
National Council.  Once the infrastructure of an accreditation agency is in
place, it may prove to be the ideal method of regulating abortion clinics in all
aspects, ensuring uniformity and good faith in the regulations it puts in
place.
Relatedly, providing an incentive for abortion clinic accreditation is
unnecessary if accreditation replaces individual state regulatory schemes.  All
abortion clinics will need to be accredited in order to open their doors to
patients.  Importantly, replacing individual state regulation with an accredita-
tion agency would make certain that all abortion clinics performing the same
procedures would be held to and meet the same standards, while simultane-
ously protecting abortion clinics nationwide from certain state regulations
aimed at effecting closure rather than ensuring women’s safety.
CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that a topic as polarizing as abortion can be addressed
through legislation alone.  However, growing fractures in abortion jurispru-
dence, particularly with respect to the role of practical considerations like
cost and geography, may indicate a new means of regulation is preferable to
the current regime.  Accreditation by an independent, nonprofit entity offers
a novel approach to ensuring a close nexus between abortion facility regula-
tions and women’s health, as well as guaranteeing uniformity in the quality of
services women receive across the entire United States.
